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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS SMITH,
PlaintifFAppellant,
vs.

Case No. 20010713 - CA

MICHAEL HARRIS,
and DOREEN HARRIS,

Priority No.: Civil

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Appellant appealed the ruling granting summary judgment issued by Judge
John R. Anderson in the 8th Judicial District in and for Uintah County. Jurisdiction
is pursuant to Article VIII Sec. 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for appellate review is that of "correctness" since the trial court'
determination is a matter of law rather than fact. "Correctness" means that the

appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the
trial judges' determination of law. State v. Pelt 861 P.2d 433 (Utah 1993).
However, "a trial court's determination on motion for judgment on the pleadings
may be affirmed on any proper ground..." Mountain American Credit Union v.
McClellan, 854 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Mr. Smith, Sued for specific performance for the sale of real
property located in Uintah County. He cited to Utah Code Annotated Sec. 70A-2301. Mr. Smith asked the court in his demand "plaintiff is entitled to an order:
finding that petitioner offered tendered in full, and that the obligation is therefore
discharged; compelling the specific performance of respondents requiring them to
transfer and deliver title, of said land, to buyer (petitioner), forthwith; and to
damages in the amount of $2000.00 for failure to fulfill specific performance, court
cost, service fees and any equitable relief, in favor of the Plaintiff, that court
determines is appropriate.
Appellee asked for summary judgment based upon the following issues:
1. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 70A-2-301 is not applicable to the sale of land.
2. Utah law forbids an action for specific performance for sale of real
property that is not memorialized in a writing.
2

The Court granted Appellee's

motion for summary judgment stating: "The defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in the defendant's memorandum in
support" (See appendix 1)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In March 2001, Appellant contacted Mr. and Mrs. Harris regarding a sale of a
small piece of property that they owned in Uintah County. The talked about the sale
of the property, and Mr. Smith made an offer. Mr. Harris was out of town and Mrs.
Harris was leaving. They instructed Mr. Smith to fax the details of his offer and
paperwork to their attorney for consultation before they agreed to enter into any
kind of an agreement for the sale of property. Mr. Smith faxed to this attorney a
"trust deed" that purported to transfer the property to "God and his Son, Jesus Christ
as tenants in common." Mr. Smith has continued to behave in a matter that is so
aggressive as to be threatening. He has continued to demand that Mr. and Mrs.
Harris sell him the property at his terms. He has continued to feel that because he
made an offer, that they were bound to accept and perform. This suit and appeal is
in complete violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that it is not
in good faith and is frivolous. As late as one month ago he called this office and
demanded that they just give in and sell him the property. It is disingenuous and a
slap in the face to all who obey the law that while making the demand (implying that
3

he has $1300) that he files with this Court an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. Mr.
Smith is an example of a small but growing band of people that use a little bit of
knowledge (ie. the Uniform Commercial Code) as a weapon injudicial terrorism.
They seem to do this in perfect understanding that they are slicing only the pieces
that they want and the rest of the law should not hamper their plans. Appellant's
Brief is further evidence of this.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SEC. 70A-2-301 IN NOT APPLICABLE TO

THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 70A-2-101 et seq. is the Uniform Commercial
Code for the State of Utah and is intended to govern the sale of goods. Section
70A-3-101 et seq. is the law governing Negotiable Instruments. Section 102 states:
"this chapter deals with negotiable instruments. In does not apply to money, to
payment orders governed by Title 70A, Chapter 4a, Uniform Commercial code
funds transfers, or to securities governed by Title 70A, Chapter 8, Uniform
Commercial Code-Investment Securities." The section cited to by Appellant in his
Complaint is "70A-3-603--Tender of Payment: (1) If tender of payment of an
obligation to pay an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the
instrument, the effect of tender is governed by principles of law applicable to tender
4

of payment under a simple contract.
(2) If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made to a
person entitled to enforce the instrument and the tender is refused, there is
discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender, of the obligation of an endorser
of accommodation party having a right of recourse with respect to the obligation to
which the tender relates.
(3) If tender of payment of an amount due on an instrument is made to a
person entitled to enforce the instrument, the obhgation of the obligor to pay interest
after the due date on the amount tendered is discharged. If presentment is required
with respect to an instrument and the obligor is able and ready to pay on the due
date at every place of payment stated in the instrument, the obligor is deemed to
have made tender of payment on the due date to the person entitled to enforce the
instrument."
There is nothing in any part of this statute that allows Appellant to do what he
tried to do in his Complaint, which was to force a sale of real property and to allow
him to tender payment when there was not a contract. The Sections of the Uniform
Commercial Code are by their terms not involved in a transaction for sale of real
property.
II.

UTAH LAW FORBIDS AN ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
5

FOR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY THAT IS NOT MEMORIALIZED IN A
WRITING.
Specific performance for the sale of real property without a writing is against
the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds prevents the enforcement of contracts
for the sale of land that have not been memorialized in writing and signed by the
selling parties. The Statute of Frauds has been codified in Utah Code Annotated
Section 25-5-3: "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or seal is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing."
"Statute of Frauds are intended to bar the enforcement of certain agreements
that the law requires to be memorialized in writing." Colonial Leasing Co. of New
England. Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction Co. 731 P.2d 483,487 (Utah 1986).
The very terms of the Complaint expressly demand that the Court enforce a
claim for sale of land without a writing. The District Court was correct in granting
summary judgment.
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
1.

Summary Judgment. Appellant correctly states the law regarding summary
6

judgment: "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) (cited in Appellant's brief p. 1) He then
goes on to say that a grant of summary judgment in this case was in error because:
"In the instant matter there was no discovery, hearing or any attempt on the part of
the court to determine the facts. The court simply summarily granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. It is without question that the affirmative defenses
and other issues raised by the Defendants created many questions of fact that
required adjudication. It is well settled that if there is even one issue of fact left
unresolved summary judgment is not appropriate." (Appellant's Brief p.4)
Appellant seems to be saying that because Defendants raised issues that could
have been decided, that they were not then entitled to summary judgment against the
Appellant on his Complaint. This is simply not the law.
"Summary judgment allows parties to pierce pleadings to determine whether
material issue of fact exists that must be resolved by the fact finder." Lamb v. B&B
Amusements Corp. 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993). "It is not the purpose of a summary
judgment procedure [for the court] to judge the credibility of the averments of the
parties or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, nor is it to deny parties the right
to trial to resolve disputed issues of fact; rather, its purpose is to eliminate time,
7

trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by
the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996).
2. & 3. Oral Contract. Appellant next argues that an oral contract existed and
that it is enforceable. This entire line of argument ignores completely that the
Statute of Frauds forbids the enforcement of this "contract" if it existed because
there was no writing. It is cases like this one that the Statute of Frauds is the law.
Here someone seeks to force the sale of land on his say that Mr. and Mrs. Harris
agreed to sell him the land. Since it is difficult to prove a negative, the law protects
a person owing real property against those who would say they agreed to sell it
without any writing to verify that.
4,

Statute of Frauds.

It is interesting to note that Appellant cites to an

incorrect section of Am Jur, namely 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts Section 67 (1964) and
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(5) to argue that the Statute of Frauds should
not apply in this case since there was no real estate agent. (Appellant's Brief p. 5) If
he could go to the bother to find this section, why could he not find the section that
deals with sale of land without a writing? It is also interesting to note that he
ignored the correct sections of Utah Code Annotated that were cited to in the
Motion for Summary Judgment. Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-3 is clear that
8

the relief requested by Appellant is not available to him, yet he persists in his blinder
approach to the law, namely only see what you want to see. The law states: "Every
contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
5. Estoppel.

Appellant argues that estoppel should overcome the summary

judgment. What he fails to mention is that the claim of estoppel was raised by
Defendants in their answer and cannot work to help the plaintiff create an issue
against the position that his pleadings put him in. Appellant also incorrectly states
that there was no discovery. Both parties had submitted and answered requests for
discovery, these did not produce any evidence that Appellant could use to bolster
his sagging arguments.
6.

Attorney fees.

Appellee requested a grant of attorney fees pursuant to

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that the suit filed by Mr. Smith is
frivolous. Judge Anderson granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, but did not
make any findings. Appellee therefore requests that the Summary Judgment be
affirmed, but that the issue of attorney fees, including the fees and costs for this
frivolous appeal be remanded to the trial court for hearing.
9

CONCLUSION
Appellee finds it of ongoing interest how Appellant continues to pick and
chose the parts of the law that he wishes to be in force and those he chooses to
ignore. This appeal is asfrivolousand unnecessary as the entire suit. From the
very beginning to their dealing with him, Mr. Smith has shown and continues to
show a lack of respect for the entirety of the law and its principles. It appeared that
he intended to transfer this property to God and his Son, Jesus Christ in an attempt
to avoid property taxes. The behavior of Appellant should not be rewarded.
Appellees again ask this Court to uphold the grant of Summary Judgment against
Appellant and to remand for findings on the grant of attorney fees.
Dated this 21st day of April, 2002.
Cindy Barton-Coombs,
Attorney for Appellee
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ Z day of April, 2002,1 placed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to:
Thomas Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, Utah 84078

r

~~^~2-VX7
^t^fZ>^//^^^^_
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MAR 1 5 2001

When Recorded Return to:
The Order of White Light
A 29 USC §508(c)(1)(A) Tsx Exempt Church
1301 W Horseshoe Bend Rd.
Vernal, UT 84078
QUIT CLAIM DEED
MICHAEL S. HARRIS AND DOREEN I. HARRIS, husband and wife as joint tenants with full righto
of survivorship and not as tenants in dommon as Grantors, hereby conveys and quit claims to Cod
and his son Jesus Christ, as joint tenants in common, Grantees, with The Order of White Light,
a 26 USC §508(c)(1)(A) Tax Exempt Religious Order (a Church), (and its (the church) successors
and assigns) Reverend Thomas Smith, as steward over the below described property, for the sum
of $21.00 lawful money Of the United* States of America the following described tract of land
located in Uintah County, Utah State Jand that such property is free of all lions and encumbrances
whatsoever, to-wit:
Beg at the SW CORNER of SE1/4 I^W1/4, Sec 14, T6S, R21E, SLM TH N 0«38'24M E 330 0 ft;
TH N 88*42'40" E 330.0 ft, TH S 330|,Q ft to'S LINE SD SE1/4 NW 1/4; TH S 89*54'21M W 330.0
ft to BEG. Cont 2 5 acres
Together with all appt irtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining, including minerals,
sand and gravel, improvements and jail water, if any.
Subject to any lawful! / recorded easements, and reservations pursuant to the land patent granted
by the United States uf America.
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor^ this

Michael S, Harris

of March, A D , 2001.

Doreen I. Harris
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

State of Utah
County of Uintah

)
)ss.
)

On the
day of March, 2001 (Vltchaei S Harris and Doreen I. Harris personally appeared
before me and was Know to me to b«f the individuals described in and who signed the within and
foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they signed the same *s their free and
voluntary act and deed, for the usesiand purposes therein mentioned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have neteunto set my hand and affixed my official seat the date and
year first above written

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

TtJTAH

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS SMITH.
Plaintiff,
RULING
vs.
DOREEN HARRIS and
MICHAEL HARRIS,

Case No. 010800145
Judge John R. Anderson

Defendants.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in the
defendant's memorandum in support..
DATED this

2±_day of August, 2001.

| ohn R. Anderson
Presiding Judge, Eighth District Court

MAILING CERTIFICATE
•t—

I do hereby certify that on the f day of August, 2001,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Cindy Barton-Coombs, Attorney for the Defendant,
193 North State Street, Roosevelt, Utah 84066; Thomas Smith, Plaintiff, 1301 WHBR, Vernal,
Utah 84078.

\/rct d&U ^

Deputy Court Clerk

DEPUTY

Thomas Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, UT 84078
March 16,2001
Michael S Harris
Doreen I Harris
3251 W. 440 S.
Vernal, UT 84078
Re: Property on Horseshoe Bend Rd.

Dear Michael and Doreen:
This is to confirm the verbal agreement and consent regarding the purchase of certain
property that you own on Horseshoe Bend Road.
I called you to inquire as to your desire to sell the said property. You stated that you would
sell it for $1300.00 cash. I accepted your price and you agreed to sell the property to me.
I prepared a quit claim deed which I faxed to your attorney on March 16, 2001. I called
and offered you the $1300.00 as mutually agreed upon. I have performed as agreed
upon, I expect that you will honor the verbal contract and perform as agreed upon.

T

f:iM ias I nrvth
3C Wh3R

4
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EK H1H COURT DISTRICT COURT
ulNTAH COUNTV, UTAH STATE
)
)
)
Incorporated Ca >e No. 0* Q8C0145
Petitioner
J

nas Srnttf*

)

)
)
)
)
)

Jlrrhael S Hams
D' tt?en I Harris
Respondents

AFFIOAVfT OF sMPECUNiOSiTY

}

Petitioner. fhomasSrntth provided the following information as required oy I tah Code Section 21*73
Affiant:
Ttr>mas So^h
1301 WHRR
Vwnat UT 64076
43,0-/61-2'5?
Affiant's financial Information
Affiant m$ not been employed since movmg to hts present address m C >u~ jer 1998
Affiant does net have any bank or checking accounts
Affaarrt does not have any accounts receivable
Affiart does not own any reai property vehicles or other persona* property other than hi'; cloths.
AfUan* does not have any debts
Affiant harf eicctnotfy m the amount of apprcx $50 00 per r onth, Telephone fnckidttg Song distance cefte
ot about S^OO CO pe» month
Atf«*m m sngaged in the full tf*ne religious activities of a .eligious order %nti receives sufficient support from
ths? chuich to cover his costs for etecwoty tei^pK^c? ard any at*>er expenses nt^;v3r>a^y in carry on his
rrvmsfry
Sub^nbed and swain August _*£_)', 2001

I certify rhai Tnonu^ Srnrth appeq-ed before me and u^5'3n*cd vaJid ia$nt'frcatK."i t w Ju ^s the person that
&rgm*u the iofqotng msu anient

Notary in and fot Umtaft County

?l\ M f m I?)
* *5v^"*5rl-

Vwnw* J*n* fr*o ft
^0»**V &<•»*»* £*>»'**

-

JAN 02 2002
Thomas Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, UT 84078
January 2 2002

O0

<%04

Cindy Barton-Coombs
RE: Smith v. Harris
Cindy:
As you are aware the Court of Appeals .las 3ot a o\ ,ev.ug schedule in the matter of Smith v.
Harris. My only interest in this matter is that the Harris' honor the agreement that we have.
My offer to purchase the land for the agreed price of $1300.00 is still open. This piece of
land is in the middle of the desert. It has no water to it. It is bordered on one side by BLM
on two sides by L J Commings land and on the remaining side by Max Young According TO
the maps at the Recorder's office it does not even have a road to it. It is no; even worth the
$1300.00 that was agreed on If the Harris' will honor the agreement and sell me the land
for the agreed price we can agree tc drop ail of these proceedings. Please e mail me at
tom@kqq.com and let me know if we can settle this matter.
Is/ Thomas Smith

0

